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Abstract 
This paper assesses how changes in the monetary policy rate transmit to the 
lending rates for the consumer, mortgage, SME, and corporate loans in the Czech 
Republic. It further examines whether this interest rate pass-through is stable or 
could vary at different levels of bank competition, leverage, non-performing loans, 
and foreign exchange (FX) interventions. Using the ARDL modelling approach, 
we find a significant and complete pass-through for SME lending rates. Significant 
structural shifts are estimated in the pass-through for mortgage and corporate rates. 
These shifts can be entirely or largely explained by bank deleveraging. We do not 
find any stable pass through for consumer lending rates. A greater spread between 
government bond and monetary policy rates increases the markup for all lending 
rates but corporate rates. FX interventions affected most the markups for corporate 
and SME rates; however, in a puzzling direction. 
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1. Introduction 
The interest rate channel of monetary policy is one important channel through which the changes in the 
monetary policy rate affect the cost and volume of lending to the real economy, and thus the credit cycle, 
business cycle, and inflation. How effective this channel can be in each economy is an empirical question 
that is of great interest to central bankers (Peter Praet, 2016; Minouche Shafik, 2016, William C. Dudley, 
2017). 
This paper assesses how the monetary policy rate affects the lending rates for the consumer, mortgage, 
small and medium enterprises (SME), and corporate loans in the Czech Republic. It further examines the 
stability of this interest rate pass-through, and whether it can vary at different levels of bank competition, 
bank leverage, borrower credit risk, and foreign exchange interventions. We also examine whether factors 
such as bank credit risk, bank competition, or foreign exchange interventions significantly influence the 
markup for lending rates over and above the monetary policy rate. Another possible determinant of the 
markup that we consider is the spread between the government bond yield and the monetary policy rate as 
a proxy for changes in the term premium and sovereign risk. We are not interested in modeling the term 
structure of interest rates and the term premium in a greater detail as in Mallick et al. (2017), Brand et al. 
(2010), or Piazzesi (2002), among others. We are simply interested in estimating a reduced form model 
describing how the monetary policy rate transmits to lending rates in different market segments, while 
controlling for macrofinancial variables that could determine the lending rate markup and the strength of 
the pass-through itself. The spread between the government bond yield and the monetary policy rate, which 
controls for the effects of the term premium and sovereign risk, is one such macrofinancial variables. 
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In 2008, the Czech Republic joined the club of high-income OECD countries.1 It is an open economy 
with exports amounting to 83 percent of GDP and one of the most industrialized countries in the EU.2,3 The 
country is not part of the Eurozone yet and maintains its own currency, the Czech koruna. The Czech 
National Bank (CNB) uses inflation targeting as the operational monetary policy regime, and the main 
monetary policy tool is the two-week repurchase rate (repo rate). The Czech financial sector is dominated 
by banks, largely foreign-owned subsidiaries of Western European banking groups. In 2017, the Czech 
banking system comprised 47 banks. The 4 largest banks accounted for 62 percent of total banking sector 
assets (about US$ 350 billion). By ownership, there were 9 domestic and 38 foreign banks, including the 4 
biggest ones. Although the global financial crisis (GFC) hit several EU countries, the Czech Republic was 
affected by the GFC only indirectly and did not experience a systemic border-line or full-blown banking 
crisis (Laeven and Valencia, 2012). The GFC’s indirect effect worked mainly through reduced export 
demand, and through the adjustment of Western European banking groups to the post GFC environment. 
Faced with the challenging low interest rate environment, the CNB complemented its traditional monetary 
policy by foreign exchange (FX) interventions as of 2013.4 Namely, the CNB announced a public 
commitment to intervene in the FX market against appreciation of the Czech koruna as necessary to keep 
the Czech koruna above 27 CZK for one euro. This one-sided exchange rate commitment helped the CNB 
in achieving its stated inflation target. The CNB abandoned the exchange rate commitment in April 2017.  
Using the autoregressive distributed lag modelling approach and a baseline linear model, we find that, 
over 2004-17, the pass-through from the monetary policy rate to mortgage, SME, and corporate lending 
rates appeared overall significant and complete. We cannot confirm long-term relationship (cointegration) 
between consumer lending rates and the monetary policy rate. Banks in the Czech Republic may thus set 
                                                     
1 OECD - Country Classification for aid and repayment terms. 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/country-classification.htm 
2 World Bank statistics (2015) - Exports of goods and services. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=CZ 
3 According to OECD industrial production index (2015), the Czech Republic is 7th most industrialized EU country. 
https://data.oecd.org/industry/industrial-production.htm 
4 Czech National Bank - The exchange rate as a monetary policy instrument – FAQs. 
https://www.cnb.cz/en/faq/the_exchange_rate_as_monetary_policy_instrument.html 
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their consumer lending rates considering factors other than the monetary policy rate. Testing the stability 
of the baseline model specification reveals structural shifts in the estimated relationship for mortgage and 
corporate rates. For the mortgage rate, these structural shifts recede when we allow for a non-linearity in 
the monetary policy rate at different levels of the bank capital to asset ratio (an interaction term)—the pass-
through to mortgage rate can thus change with the degree of bank leverage. For corporate rates, allowing 
for a similar nonlinearity helps lower the importance of the identified structural shifts (in 2007 and 2011) 
but they do not recede completely and stay significant. Nevertheless, the two structural shifts end up 
affecting only the markup over the monetary policy rate not the pass-through of the monetary policy rate 
to the corporate lending rate. Specifically, the average markup for corporate lending rates shifted up about 
54 basis points with the onset of the GFC, and then down about 57 basis points in early 2011—around the 
time when the new Capital Requirement Directive (CRD III) for the European Union was adopted and 
helped decrease the uncertainty about future bank capital requirements.5      
As for the macro-financial determinants of the lending rate markups, the spread between the 
government bond yield and the monetary policy rate is the most prominent. The spread increases most the 
mortgage and consumer rates—for instance, a one percentage point increase in the spread increases 
mortgage rates by about 70 basis points depending on the model specification. The SME and corporate 
markups respond also positively to the growth in CNB’s deposits at foreign banks (a proxy for FX 
interventions). However, this result is puzzling. It may suggest that funds that would normally be invested 
in the Czech economy were invested in the Czech korunas in the international markets shortening the supply 
of funds flowing into the Czech economy. This puzzling result needs to be confirmed and further examined 
by future research.6 In addition, as banks were deleveraging they were systematically increasing the markup 
for SME lending rates.      
                                                     
5 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130627202127/http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/legislation_in_for
ce_en.htm#maincontentSec5 
6 Using percentage or log-log growth rates or normalizing the CNB deposits by prices did not change the result. 
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Our paper contributes to the interest rate pass-through literature in three ways: (i) To our knowledge 
we are the first, who test the efficiency of the pass-through in the Czech Republic during the zero lower 
bound period. (ii) We test the effect of unconventional monetary policy in the form of FX interventions on 
the pass-through. (iii) We examine how stable the pass-through is considering possible structural shifts, as 
well as a possible variation in the pass-through with the changing macrofinancial environment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the 
theoretical underpinning for the interest rate pass-through. Section 4 describes the data and basic statistics. 
Section 5 describes the employed co-integration model and estimation method. Section 6 discusses the 
baseline estimation results. Section 7 tests for possible multiple structural breaks. Section 8 examines non-
linear dependence of the estimated pass-through on varying macrofinancial conditions. Section 9 performs 
additional tests of stability. Section 10 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The empirical literature estimating the interest rate pass-through typically uses either the cost of funds 
approach (Bondt, 2005; Hofmann, 2006; Bernhofer and van Treeck, 2013; Havránek et al., 2016) or the 
monetary policy approach (Mojon, 2000; Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci, 2004; Becker et al. (2012); Blot and 
Labondance, 2013; Holton and d‘Acri, 2015). The choice of the reference rate differentiates both methods. 
The cost of fund approach follows the term structure of interest rates assigning each lending rate a market 
rate with comparable maturity. In contrast, the monetary policy approach uses the main monetary policy 
rate (sometimes approximated by the short-term money market rate) as the reference rate for the pass-
through to all lending rates. In this paper, we follow the monetary policy approach because we are interested 
in how both the short- and long-term lending rates respond to changes in the monetary policy rate. 
Rousseas (1985) proposed a simple theoretical model for interest rate pass-through based on the 
marginal cost theory. Assuming perfect competitive markets, bank lending rates would change one-to-one 
with the monetary policy rate (the cost of funding) and one would speak about a complete pass-through. 
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However, this assumption is often violated in practice because the banking and financial market structures 
show rather monopolistically competitive or even oligopolistic behaviors. Therefore, an incomplete pass-
through could be expected. Considering the modelling approach, numerous papers examine interest rate 
pass-through using just a reference rate as an explanatory variable (Jobst and Kwapil, 2008; Holmes et al., 
2015; Bernhofer and van Treeck, 2013). In contrast, numerous other papers acknowledge that the lending 
rate markup and interest rate pass-through depend on various market conditions and not just on the monetary 
policy stance. Hence, they include more control variables (Gambacorta et al., 2015; Sander and Kleimeier, 
2006; Eller and Reininger, 2016). 
The most commonly used co-determinant of interest rate pass-through is probably bank competition. 
For instance, van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) and Mojon (2000) find, using different measures of bank 
competition, that the pass-through is faster and more complete at higher levels of bank competition. In 
addition, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Mester and Saunders (1995), Mojon (2000), Bondt (2005) point 
also to other market factors distorting the pass-through such as the non-elastic loan demand, as well as the 
existence of asymmetric information, menu costs, and switching costs. 
Other co-determinants of the pass-through involve bank characteristics such as bank assets, the leverage 
ratio, capital buffer, and the liquidity ratio, among others (Horváth and Podpiera, 2012; Holton and d’Acri, 
2015; Havránek et al., 2016; Kapuściński and Stanislawska, 2018). In the last decade, pass-through studies 
have emphasized the role of bank credit risk as a result of the GFC. For instance, Paries et al. (2014) test 
whether supply- and demand-side risks affect household and corporate rates. They find growing influence 
of borrower credit risk on corporate loan rates, particularly in Spain, Italy, and Ireland. Similarly, Holton 
and d’Acri (2015) focusing on the euro area banks report a significant effect of credit risk on the interest 
rate pass-through.  
Some papers also examine the impact of fiscal policy on the pass-through. Commercial banks use 
government bonds as an alternative investment asset to loans. Therefore, movements in the government 
bond market could affect the pass-through of the monetary policy rate to bank lending rates. Focusing on 
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EU countries, Eller and Reininger (2016) report that long-term bond yields significantly affect the long-
term lending rates in most Eurozone countries, but not the Central and Eastern European countries. In 
addition, Zoli (2013) examines the role of sovereign bond spreads in Italy’s pass-through and finds a 
significant effect on business lending rates. Paries et al. (2014) concurs with Zoli’s finding estimating a 
significant effect of the sovereign spread on the consumer and corporate rates in Italy, Spain, and Portugal. 
Overall, the empirical evidence on interest rate pass-through varies. Some studies find complete, other 
studies incomplete pass-through in different country contexts (Wang and Lee, 2009; Haughton and Iglesias, 
2012). The evidence varies also for the EU countries and their different types of loans (Hofmann, 2006; 
Sorensen and Werner, 2006; Égert et al., 2007; van Leuvensteijn et al., 2013; Belke et al., 2013; Holton and 
d‘Acri, 2015). For instance, while Rocha (2012) finds a strong pass-through from money market rates to 
general lending rates in Portugal, Hofmann (2006) finds such pass-through to be weak in Germany. For 
different types of loans in the Eurozone, Sorensen and Werner (2006) detect a higher interest rate pass-
through for mortgage rates and a lower one for consumer loan rates. In contrast, Belke et al. (2013) and 
Mojon (2000) find that, for Eurozone countries, short-term lending rates could show a stronger pass-through 
than mortgage rates. 
The onset of the global financial crisis and the resulting policy and market adjustments are generally 
seen to have weaken the interest rate pass-through. Gambacorta et al. (2015) use a cointegration model to 
examine the long-run relationship between money market rates and bank lending rates in Italy, Spain, the 
UK, and the US. They find a weakening pass-through in the post GFC period that could be associated with 
the heightened uncertainty and perception of risk. Hristov et al. (2014) analyze the interest rate pass-through 
in the Eurozone countries using panel VAR and DSGE models. They find that weaker pass-through in the 
aftermath of GFC is caused by higher distress of the banking sector. Aristei and Gallo (2014) show a 
weakened degree of the pass-through during the crisis period using a Markov-switching VAR model. In 
contrast, Borstel et al. (2016) use factor-augmented (FA)VAR framework and conclude that the GFC has 
changed only the composition of the interest rate pass-through but not the magnitude of the pass-through. 
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The post GFC period has challenged monetary policy implementation in many countries because of the 
generally low interest rate environment. Several countries thus used foreign exchange interventions as an 
unconventional monetary policy. Lízal and Schwarz (2013) pointed out that FX interventions are highly 
effective for small open economies such as the Czech Republic when the use of traditional operational tools 
(such as the repo rate) is no longer an option. They explain that the exchange rate pass-through to inflation 
might be even larger in binding conditions (ZLB on interest rates) because the import price channel and the 
real interest rate channel work in the same directions. Therefore, for the Czech Republic, the use of FX 
interventions is a reasonable choice considering the “unlimited” capability of the CNB to buy foreign assets. 
Franta et al. (2014) reviews the use of FX interventions in the Czech Republic as a form of quantitative 
easing. Switzerland has also used FX interventions to implement monetary policy at the zero lower bound 
(ZLB); however, less efficiently. For instance, Amador et al. (2017) show that FX interventions are costly 
for the Swiss central bank—because of their negative impact on balance sheet—and for the economy. The 
challenges with monetary policy implementation at the ZLB using FX interventions include the well-known 
example of Japan starting in the 1990s. In Japan, similarly as in Switzerland, the use of FX interventions 
was effective only to a limited extent (Iwata and Wu, 2012). In particular, the impact of the FX interventions 
on the pass-through to retail lending rates in a low interest rate environment has not been examined by the 
empirical literature. This paper helps fill this gap. 
For the Czech Republic, to our knowledge, only two papers estimate the interest rate pass-through. 
Horváth and Podpiera (2012) detect fast and almost complete pass-through for the mortgages and firm 
lending rates using the pooled mean group estimation approach. They emphasize that factors such as bank 
asset size, capital, amount of deposits, and credit risk affect the pass-through. The study, however, does not 
cover much of the post GFC period.7 Havránek et al. (2016) analyze the interest rate pass-through in the 
Czech Republic during 2004-13. They find a weaker interest rate pass-through for corporate lending rates 
                                                     
7 Babecká-Kucharčuková et al. (2013) update the results by Horváth and Podpiera (2012) using the same approach 
with the sample period extended to December 2009. Their results show only minor changes. In general, they confirm 
mostly weaker interest rate pass-through in compare to the original research. 
8 
 
and stronger for mortgage lending rates after the onset of the GFC. Nevertheless, the interest rate pass-
through and its effectiveness in the Czech Republic remain under-researched and this paper helps close this 
gap. 
Our paper differs from the one by Havránek et al. (2016) in several ways. First, we study the pass-
through from the monetary policy rate to lending rates and do not assume a perfect correlation between the 
money market rate (or the CZEONIA rate) and the two-week repo rate (the monetary policy instrument). 
We contribute to Havránek et al. and the literature by estimating a richer model for the pass-through 
controlling for bank lending concentration, the bank leverage, the non-performing loans ratio, FX 
interventions, and the spread between the government bond yield and the monetary policy rate—a join 
control for changing term premium and sovereign risk. Furthermore, we consider and test for possible 
multiple structural breaks—for instance, due to the onset of the GFC in 2007, the emergence of the 
European debt crisis, the monetary policy rate reaching the zero lower bound (ZLB), the CNB announcing 
systematic foreign exchange interventions, and the changing banking conditions in response to the GFC.8 
In addition, we test for possible non-linear dependence of the pass through on varying macroeconomic 
conditions. 
Andries and Billon (2016) provide a useful survey of the interest rate pass through literature and the 
challenges it faces. The study discusses, among others, the issues of non-linear pass-through in particular 
issues with an asymmetric pass-through. Wang and Lee (2009) and Haughton and Iglesias (2012) are 
example studies that use threshold autoregressive (TAR) models and models of conditional 
heteroscedasticity to estimate possible asymmetry in the interest rate pass-through. Asymmetric 
adjustments are a type of non-linearity that the interest rate pass-through can exhibit and policy maker may 
need to account for. Other types of non-linearities dependent on the state of the economy—for instance, 
business or credit cycle, bank competition, bank leverage—are equally interesting and important to policy 
makers. In addition to the models used by Wang and Lee (2009) and Haughton and Iglesias (2012), other 
                                                     
8 This includes global deleveraging and de-risking, and changes in regulation and supervision in the EU. 
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statistical approaches could be considered to examine asymmetries, including regimes shifts within, for 
instance, Markov-switching models (Aristei and Gallo, 2014). Along these advance statistical approaches 
to examine possible non-linearities in the pass through, a more structural approaches could be applied to 
provide complementary empirical insights that can be equally important to policymakers. To our 
knowledge, the structural approach to assessing non-linearity in the pass-through has not been explored 
much in the existing research. Our paper takes this avenue to help fill the possible gap and inform policy 
makers about changing pass-through at different levels of macrofinancial determinants using interactive 
regression terms. 
3. Theoretical Motivation 
Rousseas (1985) defines a simple markup equation for commercial banks to describe the interest rate 
pass-through process: 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝑘𝑘(𝑢𝑢), (1) 
where lr is the bank lending rate, k is a markup function reflecting the degree of monopoly or market power 
exercised by individual bank or, in aggregate, by the banking industry as a whole. And u is the unit prime 
or variable costs incurred by banks, basically the interest paid on deposits and borrowed funds. Growing 
market power or growing prime costs of the bank lead to an increase in bank lending rates. Since the banking 
market structure is not perfectly competitive, one can assume a permanent markup over the bank costs of 
funds for lending rates. Assuming a constant mark-up, equation (1) could be written in a linear form as: 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢. (2) 
where 𝛼𝛼 is the markup over the bank cost of funds and 𝛽𝛽 is a degree of the pass-through from the bank cost 
of funds to its lending rate. Rousseas (1985) suggests approximating the cost of funds with the monetary 
policy rate.9 Hence, changes in the main monetary policy rate can determine bank lending rates. Moreover, 
                                                     
9 For instance, Grigoli and Mota (2017) follow this suggestion. 
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note that the spread 𝛼𝛼 can comprise both constant and time-varying components. The latter component 
considers the possibility that the bank market structure, bank conditions, and other macrofinancial 
conditions, which determine the markup, could vary over-time: 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = �𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡. (3) 
Failing to account for the possible time-varying component of the spread, 𝛼𝛼2,𝑡𝑡, could bias the 𝛽𝛽 estimate. 
Synthesizing the existing literature, 𝛼𝛼2,𝑡𝑡 is determined by vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 including macro-financial factors such 
as bank competition10, credit risk premium11, and the alternative return from investing in government 
bonds12,13: 
 𝛼𝛼2,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 . (4) 
We discussed the effect of bank competition on the pass-through earlier as part of the Rousseas (1985) 
model. Therefore, we proceed with discussing the effect of credit risk. The credit risk arises on both the 
borrower side and the bank side. On the bank side, credit risk could be measured as capital to assets ratio—
the bank leverage (Chileshe and Akanbi, 2016).  
On the borrower side, the credit risk is mostly related to the problem of asymmetrical information. 
Since commercial banks cannot easily distinguish between creditworthy borrowers and risky borrowers, 
they must assume default of some loans. The probability of loan default may rise when the lending rate 
increases. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) differentiate two effects connected to imperfect information: (i) the 
adverse selection effect, and (ii) the incentive (moral hazard) effect. The adverse selection effect describes 
the situation when growing interest rates push out safer but less profitable loans, and, in contrast, attract 
riskier projects with higher expected returns. Therefore, with growing interest rates commercial banks face 
a challenging situation when they must decide which borrower is more likely to repay its debt. The incentive 
                                                     
10 van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013), Leroy and Luccote (2015), Chileshe and Akanbi (2016). 
11 Gambacorta et al. (2015), Bondt (2005), Mihaylov (2016), Grigoli and Mota (2017), Chileshe and Akanbi (2016). 
12 Holton and d’Acri (2015), Cifarelli and Paladino (2016). 
13 For instance, this paper includes in vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 foreign exchange interventions as an unconventional monetary policy 
tool. 
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(moral hazard) effect concerns the borrower investment decision. Higher lending rates force the borrower 
to invest in riskier projects to obtain higher returns. Therefore, safer projects are pushed out by more 
profitable but riskier projects.  
These two effects can make banks unwilling to further increase the lending rate after reaching its 
optimal level because of the increasing probability of default (credit rationing). This situation leads to 
upward stickiness of lending rates. However, as Bondt (2005) pointed out, banks do not have to ration 
credit. Instead, they can increase the risk premium on loans. This bank strategy could result in 
overestimating of the retail rate pass-through (𝛽𝛽 > 1). To avoid this possible bias, we control for the 
borrower credit risk by adding the non-performing loans ratio in vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡. 
Further, when the interest rates are at zero lower bound (ZLB), the credit risk could play a different 
role. In the post-crisis environment, banks usually tighten their lending standards and even though the 
monetary policy is eased, the supply of loans is restricted (Altavilla et al., 2015; Bijsterbosch and 
Falagiarda, 2014; and Plašil et al., 2012). Moreover, right after the crisis banks typically evaluate new loans 
with a greater risk premium. This, in turn, leads to a downward stickiness in the lending rates. 
Using government bonds as an alternative asset to loans may shift bank decision from commercial 
lending to governments lending, especially in the post GFC period. The alternative return from investing 
in government bonds is reflected by the spread between the government bond yield and the repo rate. It 
captures the impact of fiscal policy and time varying sovereign risk, as well as the expectations about the 
future path of short-term rates and the term premium, which further affect the setting of long-term lending 
rates (Hofmann and Mizen, 2004).14 
Lastly, after 2008, the monetary conditions in the Czech Republic eased markedly, with the repo rate 
hitting the ZLB. The CNB started using foreign exchange interventions as an alternative monetary policy 
                                                     
14 There can also be a feedback effect as these long rates may be influenced by the expectations of fiscal actions. For 
modelling of the strategic monetary-fiscal interactions see Libich et al. (2015) 
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tool as of November 2013 to manage the business cycle and inflation.15 In this situation, the monetary 
policy may experience less effective transmission mechanism, especially during economic recovery (Borio 
and Hofmann, 2017). Therefore, we further examine whether the pass-through environment changed 
significantly with the greater use of FX interventions. 
4. Data 
We use monthly data from January 2004 to November 2017 from the CNB’s ARAD database.16 Data 
series and their sources are in the appendix (table A1). We examine the pass-through to four different 
lending rates: The consumer loan rate (LRCONS), mortgage loan rate (LRMORT), small corporate loan rate 
(LRSME), and large corporate loan rate (LRCORP). Small corporate loan rates are defined as lending rates 
on loans up to 30 million CZK granted to non-financial corporations, while large corporate loan rates are 
lending rates on loans over 30 million CZK granted to non-financial corporations. For the monetary policy 
reference rate, we use the two-week repo rate (MPR). 
Figure 1 shows that lending rates appear to co-move together, except for the consumer loan rate, which 
does not exhibit a visible relationship with the repo rate. Therefore, consumer loan rates could have been 
influenced by other factors than the remaining lending rates. The corporate loan rate appears to co-move 
with the repo rate most closely, especially before 2009. Mortgage and SME loan rates seem to have reacted 
much less to the sharp decrease of the repo rate over 2008-9. Nevertheless, both rates still follow a 
decreasing trend of the repo rate until the end of our sample period. In 2012, the CNB has further lowered 
the main monetary policy rate to its ZLB level. While the corporate loan rates promptly reacted to this 
move, other rates responded less and with a delay.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
                                                     
15 The use of FX interventions as an alternative monetary policy tool was officially ended in April 2017. 
https://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/exit_exchange_rate_commit/index.html  
16 The Czech National Bank’s Aggregated Time Series Database (ARAD) calculate the interest rate series as weighted 
average rates on loans granted to clients. For more detail see http://www.cnb.cz/docs/ARADY/MET_LIST/mir_en.pdf 
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To test whether changes in bank competition affect the pass-through environment in the Czech 
Republic, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of bank lending. Although the literature prefers 
more direct measures of bank competition such as the Lerner or Boon indicators (van Leuvensteijn et al. 
2013; Leroy and Lucotte, 2015), we use the HHI because of data availability in monthly frequency and data 
coverage of our sample period. The Lerner index and Boone indicator are published only in annual 
frequency and until 2014. Although the HHI measures banking sector concentration, in the case of the 
Czech Republic, the HHI for lending to non-financial corporations correlates well with the annual Lerner 
index showing correlation coefficient of 0.94 (see figure 2, left panel). Therefore, using the HHI as a proxy 
measure for bank competition in the Czech Republic seems practical. Figure 2 (right panel) plots the HHI 
along the repo rate. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 and 4 shows the remaining explanatory variables included in vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡. The ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (NPLR) measures the borrower credit risk (figure 3, left panel). We use the 
respective NPLR for consumers (NPLRCONS), mortgages (NPLRMORT), and non-financial companies 
(NPLRNFC). Over 2004-8, the three ratios were trending down, rapidly increasing over 2008-10, and 
returning to their pre-crisis levels at the end of the sample period. The NPLR for consumers remained stable 
at 12 percent until the end of 2015 when it has started declining. For mortgages, the NPLR exhibits a similar 
trend as the NPLR for consumer loans but at much lower levels. Mortgages seem to be the least risky credit 
for banks compared with other consumer and business loans. For corporate loans, the NPLR trended down 
as of 2011 converging to pre-2008 levels by 2017.17 
The Czech banking system does not show any significant evidence of systemic insolvency pressures 
during the sample period. The ratio of bank capital to assets (CAPTOASSETS) shows relatively modest 
variation between 9-12 percent with only a mild decrease in 2008 and 2017 below 10 percent (figure 3, 
                                                     
17 For the analysis of macroeconomic drivers of non-performing loans ratio in the Czech Republic see Melecky et al. 
(2015). 
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right panel). Numerous studies emphasize the influence of bank leverage on commercial lending (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1995; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Ciccarelli et al., 2015). Therefore, we control for the possible 
effect of bank capitalization on bank lending rates as well. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The spread between the government bond yield and the repo rate (SPREAD_GBYREPO), which we use 
to control for the term premium, sovereign risk, and the alternative cost of investing in government bonds 
rather than lending to the private sector, is shown in figure 4 (left panel). Before 2008, the repo rate and the 
spread seem to show a negative correlation, whereas after 2009, the spread follows the decreasing trend of 
the repo rate. 
Lastly, we plot the FX interventions against the repo rate (figure 4, right panel). Figure 4 indicates a 
rapid grow of FX interventions starting in November 2013 and peaking in 2017. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The summary statistics (table A2) show that, on average, banks charge the highest rates on consumer 
loans and the lowest rates on corporate loans. Correspondingly, the average NPLR (the borrower credit 
risk) is also the highest for consumer loans. The least risky loans seem to be the mortgage loans, followed 
by the corporate loans.  
We perform a cross correlation test between variables in first differences (table A3). The results show 
almost a zero correlation coefficient between the repo rate and the consumer lending rate. Other lending 
rates are positively correlated with the repo rate. The highest correlation coefficient of about 0.36 is found 
between the repo rate and the corporate loan rate. 
We test the degree of integration for the employed time series using three different unit root tests (table 
A4). First, we perform the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests, where the null 
hypothesis confirms the existence of a unit root. For robustness, we use the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
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Shin (KPSS) test, which has an opposite null hypothesis (the time series is stationary). The results of ADF 
and PP tests show that the mortgage lending rate could be stationary in levels. However, we could not 
confirm this result with the KPSS test. All other time series are integrated to order one, I(1). Therefore, we 
treat all variables, including the mortgage rate as integrated to order one for the purpose of our analysis. 
In addition, we report the results of unit root tests with a possible structural break (table A5 in the 
appendix). Although the tests identify breaks in the individual time series, we are more interested in whether 
the structural break(s) occurred in the studied multivariate relationship among the considered variables. 
Therefore, section 7 performs multi-variate tests of stability for the estimated relationships.  
5. Estimation Methodology 
We employ the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran 
et al. (2001) to estimate the assumed cointegration relationship and the associated short-run dynamics. The 
advantage of the model is that it allows us to use stationary time series I(0) as well as first order integrated 
time series I(1). Moreover, we can distinguish between short-run and long-run reaction of bank lending 
rates to changes in the monetary policy rate, and determine the speed of adjustment toward the long-run 
equilibrium. 
First, we define the long-run co-integration relationship based on equations (1) and (2) as: 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 , (5) 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 is the bank lending rate, 𝛼𝛼1 is the estimated constant, which represents the long term markup 
between the repo rate and the bank lending rate, 𝛽𝛽 is the coefficient of long-run pass-through, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 is the 
repo rate, 𝛾𝛾 is the estimated vector of coefficients on the control variables 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡, and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the error term. 
Estimated 𝛽𝛽 equaling to one would indicate a complete pass-through. In contrast, estimated 𝛽𝛽 smaller than 
one would indicate incomplete pass-through, and 𝛽𝛽 higher than one would indicate an overshooting of the 
lending rate. The vector of control variables, 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡, includes, the risk premium component comprising the 
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𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans for the respective loan segment, and 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 
the ratio of bank capital to total bank assets. The vector further contains, 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, the spread 
between the government bond yield and the repo rate, 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡, the log-log difference of Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of bank lending concentration, and 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, the log-log difference of CNB’s deposits 
in foreign banks measuring the size of FX interventions. In addition, we control for a possible time trend in 
the estimation. 
To simplify the exposition of the ARDL estimation method, let us assume the ARDL (1,0,0)18: 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿1 + 𝜓𝜓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 . (6) 
Hence, the error correction model (ECM) can be written as follow:19 
 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝜓𝜓Δ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃Δ𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 , (7) 
  short run dynamics  long run relationship   
where 
𝜆𝜆 = −(1 − 𝜇𝜇),𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛿𝛿11 − 𝜇𝜇 ,𝛽𝛽 = 𝜓𝜓1 − 𝜇𝜇 , 𝛾𝛾 = 𝜃𝜃1 − 𝜇𝜇. 
The ECM equation (equation 7) displays the short run dynamics (terms with delta symbol) as well as 
long run relationship (terms in parenthesis). The coefficient 𝜆𝜆 represents the speed of adjustment toward 
the long-run equilibrium. Since we assume return of lending rates to their equilibrium level, the coefficient 
is expected to be negative and significant. In general, higher 𝜆𝜆 (in absolute terms) means a faster adjustment 
of lending rates, and thus more efficient pricing of the rates.  
To confirm the existing cointegration relationship between variables, we use the Bound test proposed 
by Pesaran et al. (2001). It allows us to compare the estimated F-statistic value with border critical values 
                                                     
18 Numbers in parentheses show lag length structure. In our estimation, we use the Schwarz criterion (SC) to select an 
appropriate lag structure of endogenous variables in each ARDL model. 
19 Similar specifications with a set of conditioning variables were used, for instance, by Leroy and Luccote (2015), 
Gambacorta et al. (2015), Grigoli and Mota (2017), Chileshe and Akanbi (2016), Holton and d’Acri (2015). 
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for I(0) and I(1) time series. If the estimated value of the F-statistic is higher than the upper bound value 
provided by Pesaran et al. (2001), then we can confirm the cointegration relationship. 
6. Estimation Results for Baseline Specification 
We estimate the pass-through and its determinants for four different types of lending rates: The 
consumer loan rate, mortgage loan rate, small corporate (SME) loan rate, and large corporate loan rate. The 
estimation results are reported in table 1. We show both the long-run relationship and the short-run 
dynamics of the estimated relationship for lending rates. 
The results suggest that according to the ARDL Bounds test we cannot confirm a long-run relationship 
for consumer lending rates. Nevertheless, mortgage, SME, and corporate rates co-move with the repo rate, 
suggesting a complete pass-through in the long run. In the short run, the mortgage rate showed the weakest 
pass-through and speed of adjustment to the equilibrium. The short-run pass-through to SME and corporate 
rates is much stronger. Namely, using equation 7, the estimates suggest that banks transmit 45 and 34 
percent of the change in the repo rate into their SME and corporate rates in the following period (month). 
The borrower credit risk (NPLR) significantly increases the lending rate premiums over the repo rate 
only for the consumer rate. In contrast, the bank credit risk measured by the capital to assets ratio affects 
only the SME rate. Less leveraged banks extended riskier SME loans with proportionately higher rates than 
did the more leveraged banks. Interestingly, bank credit risk did not have significant impact on the mortgage 
rate and corporate rate. For the mortgage rate, it is perhaps due to low risk perception of the real estate 
market and the dominant collateralizing with primary residence. For the corporate rate, it may be due to a 
reduced supply of loans in the post-2008 period together with a crowding out effect of government bonds, 
which pushed riskier corporate loans from the market. 
The spread between the government bond yield and the repo rate has a significant effect on all lending 
rates. The effect is stronger for loans to households than loans to enterprises. This result could suggest that 
the term premium and/or sovereign risk could affect households more than enterprises. While the spread 
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affects all lending rates, bank lending concentration, our control proxy for bank competition, does not affect 
any of our lending rates when controlling for other macro-financial determinants. 
The FX interventions, measured by the log-log difference of central bank deposits in foreign banks 
(grCBDEP), significantly influence the SME and corporate lending rates. However, the results are 
counterintuitive. Lower growth rate of FX interventions helps decrease the interest rates. Perhaps funds that 
would, at existing interest rate spread and risk premium, flow to the Czech economy stayed abroad and 
were used to buy the Czech korunas offshore. Hence, the supply of capital to the Czech economy might 
have decreased, helping to increase the lending rate. Nevertheless, this would render the FX interventions 
ineffective through the interest rate channel and leave their effectiveness dependent only on other channels 
such as the exchange rate channel. Future research could investigate this hypothesis in detail. 
Loan rates for mortgages and corporations show significant trends over time on top of the one followed 
by the monetary policy rate and all other variables covered in vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡. The time trend has mildly positive 
slope for both rates. One explanation of the mild trends could be a possible shift in the respective interest 
rate spreads (gradual repricing of risk) and the underlying relationships after the GFC that indirectly 
affected also the financial sector behavior in the Czech Republic. 
[Table 1 about here] 
7. Testing for Possible Structural Shifts (Breaks) 
The last decade in the Czech Republic and whole Europe has been characterized by lower stability or 
instability, respectively. Hence, we perform several tests of multiple breakpoints to identify any possible 
structural breaks in our estimated baseline model. We consider four different tests for multiple unknown 
breakpoints. Two of them use the global optimization procedure and other two use the sequential procedure 
Perron (2006). The results of all tests are shown in table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
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The estimated models for consumer and SME lending rates seem to be stable and we could not confirm 
any structural breaks. For mortgage and corporate lending rates, however, the tests detect mostly two 
breakpoints. We choose the Bai-Perron (1998) test with globally determined breaks as our preferred test 
because, according to Perron (2006), it performs better than sequential tests in determining multiple 
structural shifts. In line with the results of our preferred test, we set the break dates for the mortgage lending 
rate to September 2010 and February 2014. The dates may represent a delay reaction of the mortgage market 
to the onset of GFC, and the monetary policy rate hitting the zero lower bound in December 2012. For 
corporate lending rates, the break dates are set to August 2007 and January 2011. In contrast to the mortgage 
market, the non-financial sector may be more efficient and respond largely in expectation. Therefore, the 
first break may reflect the response to the onset of GFC in the US, while the second break may be connected 
to adoption of new regulation framework for the EU banks.  
To control for structural changes, we extend our baseline model by shift dummies according to the Bai 
and Perron multiple break test (table 2, test 1): 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜌𝜌1𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔_1𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝜌𝜌2𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔_2𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝜌𝜌3(𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔_1𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)+ 𝜌𝜌4(𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔_2𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 , (8) 
where the 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔_1𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 and 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔_2𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 are specified for each lending rate as shown in table 3.  
[Table 3 about here] 
We re-estimate the model using the ARDL approach. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The results show, that the pass-through to mortgage rates dropped significantly after 2014 and turned 
out to be negative. Thus, in response to the MPR reaching the zero lower bound, the pass-through to 
mortgage rates fell practically to zero. In contrast, the pass-through to corporate lending rates is not showing 
any structural shifts. Specifically, while the 2014 dummy variable significantly affects the size of the pass-
through for mortgage rates—the respective interactive term is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
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level—the dummy variables in model for corporate rates are insignificant in interaction with the MPR. 
However, the two dummies affect the conditional mean of the corporate lending rate, indicating structural 
shifts in the markup function. In the first case, August 2007, the expectations about a possible global 
financial crisis led to an increase of the corporate lending rate (its markup) by 1 percentage point. In the 
second case, January 2011, the situation was reversed and the average markup dropped down by 0.8 
percentage point around the time when the new Capital Requirement Directive (CRD III) for the European 
Union was adopted and helped decrease the uncertainty about future bank capital requirements. 
In the short-run, estimates support the long-run results for corporate rates. They confirm stable pass-
through and significant effect of both dummy variables on corporate lending rates (markups). For 
mortgages, the 2014 dummy variable no longer affects the size of the pass-through, but directly the lending 
rate markup. 
Turning to the control variables, we register only mild differences in estimation results compared with 
our baseline model estimates. First, with the inclusion of the shift dummy variables, the effect of the spread 
between the government bond yield and the repo rate becomes insignificant for corporate lending rates. In 
contrast, the effect of NPLR turns out to be significant—indicating that banks could increase the markup 
(charge a higher risk premium) on corporate loans to cover increasing expected loses when NPLR for 
corporations rises. 
Interestingly, with the inclusion of the shift dummies, the speeds of adjustment (pricing efficiency) 
increased for all lending rates. While the speed of adjustment for the mortgage rates increased only 
modestly, the one for corporate rates doubled. 
8. Non-linear Effects 
To test whether the individual variables in our vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 affect both the average markup and the pass-
through from monetary policy rate, we specify the model to include the following interaction terms: 
21 
 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 . (9) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 represents the interactions of all variables in vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 with the monetary policy rate. We 
test the significance of the interaction terms one by one. If the interaction term is jointly significant with 
the corresponding explanatory variable, we include the term into the final model specification. The final 
estimated models are shown in table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
According to the results, we cannot confirm any non-linear effect for consumer and SME lending rates. 
For these two rates, we return back to the baseline specification for our final model estimation. For the other 
two rates on mortgages and corporate loans, we find significant negative effects of an interaction between 
the monetary policy rate (MPR) and capital to assets ratio (CAPTOASSETS) on the respective lending rates. 
The total size of the interest rate pass-through may by calculated according to the following equation: 
 Pass-through = 𝛽𝛽 + 𝜑𝜑2 ∙ average captoassets, (10) 
where 𝛽𝛽 shows the mean pass-through (MPR coefficient), 𝜑𝜑2 represents the coefficient of the interaction 
term (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡), and average captoassets is the unconditional sample mean of the capital 
to assets ratio (see the Summary statistics in table A4). 
According to equation 10, we calculate the pass-through for mortgage rates to equal 0.56, and for 
corporate rates to equal 0.5, when the pass through is allowed to vary with the degree of bank leverage. The 
results demonstrate a significant decline of the pass-through compared with the baseline estimation for 
periods when bank leverage fell to or below its sample mean value. Therefore, deleveraging of the banking 
sector has significantly reduced the strength of the pass-through from the monetary policy rate to mortgage 
and corporate lending rates. Presumably, higher capital requirements imposed by the incoming BASEL III 
regulatory framework have pushed banks to enforce tighter lending standards, which have interacted with 
the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism. Specifically, banks at higher lending standards 
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might have been forced to reduce their lending activity to maintain an adequate capital ratio, which 
decreased the sensitivity of their lending rates to changes in the monetary policy rate. 
Considering the significance of other variables included in vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡, the estimates of the non-linear 
model are similar to those of the model with structural shift dummies. The results show a significant positive 
effect of the spread between government bond yield and the repo rate (SPREAD_GBYREPO) on the 
mortgage lending rate, and a significant positive effect of the non-performing loans ratio (NPLR) and FX 
interventions (CBDEP) on the corporate lending rate. 
An interesting hypothesis to test next is whether the interaction between the capital to assets ratio and 
the monetary policy rate could explain the structural breaks estimated earlier using the shift dummies. 
Hence, we again test for possible multiple breaks for the estimated models specified in equation 9. 
[Table 6 about here] 
The multiple breakpoint tests do not reveal any structural changes for the mortgage lending rate. This 
result suggests that the process of deleveraging caused the break in the pass-through for the mortgage 
lending rate. For the corporate lending rate, we mostly confirm zero breaks as well. However, when using 
a different statistic than F-test, two breakpoints are indicated by the Bai-Perron test. Therefore, we estimate 
yet another model for the corporate lending rate including both dummy variables together with the 
interaction term for the monetary policy rate and the capital to assets ratio. The equation is specified as 
follows:  
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑2(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) + 𝜌𝜌1𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔_1𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆+ 𝜌𝜌2𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔_2𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 . (11) 
Table 7 shows the estimation results. The interactive term and both dummies turn out to be significant. 
However, the size of the coefficients for both dummy variables decreased almost by half. This result 
suggests that the capital to assets ratio partly, but not fully, explains the structural shifts in the pass through 
for the corporate loans. Using equation 10, we determine the size of the interest rate pass-through to be 
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0.57, which is similar to the results of the model with interaction terms only. Therefore, increasing capital 
ratios (deleveraging) is mostly responsible for the reduced pass-through to corporate lending rates. 
Lastly, we confirm the significant effect of the NPL ratio and FX interventions—measured as central 
bank deposits in foreign banks. Both results are robust, holding throughout all extended specifications. 
[Table 7 about here] 
9. Further Tests of Stability 
We further test the stability of the best-fitting models using rolling regressions to gain insights into the 
sample dynamics of the estimated pass-through. We roll through the sample (January 2004 – November 
2017) using a fixed window of 75 observations and the step size set to one. Doing this, we get 92 estimated 
time-varying coefficients of the interest rate pass-through. We plot their dynamics over time and compare 
it to the estimated mean and confidence intervals for the entire sample. Figure 5 plots the estimated rolling 
pass-through for each market segment. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
The rolling pass-through for the consumer lending rate shows two major drops into the negative 
territory (figure 5, top left panel). Recall that we could not confirm any cointegration relationship between 
the repo rate and consumer loans rate. The rolling estimates could thus simply reflect the overall instability 
of the pass-through for consumer rates. For the mortgage lending rates, the rolling pass-through shows a 
small drop followed by a sharp increase in 2011. As of 2012, the rolling coefficient gradually declines 
reaching a zero pass-through by 2016 (figure 5, top right panel). 
The SME rolling pass-through exhibits the highest stability over time (figure 5, bottom left panel). The 
moderate decline in 2012-14 is promptly reversed. By the end of 2015 and at the beginning of 2016, the 
SME rolling coefficient falls rapidly, reducing the pass-through efficiency by half. The rolling coefficient 
for corporate loans follows a similar trend as the rolling coefficient for mortgages (figure 5, bottom right 
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panel). In this case, the plot shows a continuous decline of the pass-through starting at the end of 2011 
followed by a deep sudden fall to zero at the beginning of 2015. By the end of the estimation period, the 
rolling pass-through partly recovers and returns into the wider confidence band.  
Overall, the rolling pass-through for mortgage and corporate lending rates indicate that, after 2012-13, 
the interest rate channel of monetary policy becomes unstable. According to our previous estimations, the 
instability could be partly related to the deleveraging of the Czech banking sector. To gain further insight, 
figure 6 plots the rolling pass-through against the rolling mean of the capital to assets ratio. The figure 
illustrates the opposite trends in the rolling pass-through and average capital to asset ratio for mortgage and 
corporate rates corroborating our estimation results with interaction terms. An increasing capital to assets 
ratio has, on average, restrained the strength of the pass-through. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
In addition, we estimate the rolling coefficients for the spread between the government bond rate and 
the monetary policy rate. This spread could capture the effects of a changing term premium and sovereign 
risk on the markup for different lending rates. We have previously estimated that this spread significantly 
influences the markups for all rates—perhaps apart from the corporate lending rates when considering the 
model specification with interactive terms. For SME and corporate rates, the respective rolling coefficients 
are estimated to be more stable than for consumer and mortgage rates (figure A1 in the appendix).  
We also perform the CUSUM test for our best-fitting models: The baseline model for consumer and 
SME lending rates, the model with interaction terms for mortgages, and the model with interaction terms 
and breakpoint dummies for the corporate lending rates. The CUSUM tests and the CUSUM of squares 
tests are plotted in figures A2 and A3 in the appendix. Both tests confirm that our models are overall stable 
in their parameters, except the consumer lending rate model. Recall that, for consumer lending rates, we 
could not confirm any long-run cointegration relationship. 
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10. Conclusion 
This paper examined how changes in the monetary policy rate affected the lending rates for consumer, 
mortgage, SME, and corporate loans in the Czech Republic from January 2004 to November 2017. To this 
end, we controlled for changing macro-financial factors that could affect the lending rate markup and 
possibly the pass-through as well. Moreover, we tested whether the interest rate pass-through is stable or 
depends on the level of bank competition, bank leverage, borrower credit risk, and the use of FX 
interventions.  
Using the ARDL modelling approach, we found a stable long-run interest rate pass-through for 
mortgages, SME, and corporate lending rates. With no model specification could we confirm a stable pass-
through from the monetary policy rate to consumer lending rates. The most important determinant of the 
markup across all considered lending rates is the spread between the government bond rate and the monetary 
policy rate, which captures the influence of a changing term premium and sovereign risk. The increasing 
spread raises the lending rate markup more for the mortgage and consumer rates than for the SME and 
corporate rates. The markup for SME and corporate rates is also significantly influenced by the level of 
CNB foreign currency deposits abroad—our proxy of FX interventions—however, in a puzzling direction. 
One explanation could be that rising CNB deposits abroad and the foreign currency investments in Czech 
korunas might not have increased the supply of funds in the Czech economy if these koruna investments 
stayed abroad. Moreover, the funds that would otherwise flow into the Czech economy stayed invested (in 
the korunas) abroad. In addition, the SME markup increases when the capital to assets ratio rises and banks 
deleverage.      
Testing the stability of the estimated models, we found significant structural shifts in the models of 
interest rate pass-through for the mortgage and corporate lending rates. For the mortgage rate, these 
structural shifts can be fully explained and the model stabilized by allowing the pass-through to vary with 
different levels of bank leverage. For the corporate rates, allowing a similar interaction can explain much 
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of the structural shifts but not all of them. Namely, the markup for corporate rates experienced two structural 
shifts in 2007—an increasing markup after the onset of the global financial crisis—and in 2011—a 
declining markup around the adoption to new CRD III for the EU. For both the mortgage and corporate 
rates, we found that when banks, in their deleveraging, reached the sample mean of the capital to assets 
ratio, the pass-through fell to about 0.5, indicating much smaller influence of monetary policy over the 
pricing of mortgages and corporate loans. 
To gain further insights into the stability of the estimated pass through, we estimated the rolling pass-
through for each lending market segment. These rolling pass-through coefficients indicated a greater 
stability of the pass-through to SME rates than to corporate and mortgage rates. The most volatile rolling 
pass-through estimated for the consumer rates reflects the overall instability and lacking cointegration for 
these rates. While all rolling pass-through coefficients decline at the end of the sample period, the declines 
are more pronounced for mortgage and corporate rates than for the SME rate. They reflect the role of 
declining leverage and increasing ratios of capital to assets. 
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Figure 1 - Individual Lending Rates and the Repo Rate 
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Source: CNB’s ARAD database (2017) 
 
 
Figure 2 - Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a Proxy for Lerner Index and Bank Competition 
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Figure 3 - Non-Performing Loans and Capital to Assets Ratio against the Repo Rate 
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Source: CNB’s ARAD database (2017) 
 
 
Figure 4 – Spread between GBY and Repo Rate and FX Reserves (CBDEP) against the Repo 
Rate 
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Figure 5 - Rolling Coefficient of the Monetary Policy Rate (Baseline Model) 
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Notes: Rolling regression with fixed window (window size: 75, step size: 1, number of subsamples: 92). Horizontal lines represent 
confidence intervals of two, three and six standard deviations. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Rolling Coefficient of the Monetary Policy Rate vs Rolling Mean Value of Capital to 
Assets Ratio 
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confidence intervals of two, three and six standard deviations (MPR).  
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Table 1 – Results of Baseline Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Consumer Loans Mortgage Loans SME Loans Corporate Loans 
Long-run Cointegration Relationship 
MPR 0.9323
*** 
(0.3094) 
1.1413*** 
(0.1331) 
0.9546*** 
(0.0371) 
1.1437*** 
(0.1171) 
NPLR 0.5464
** 
(0.2314) 
-0.1857 
(0.1952) 
-0.0132 
(0.0390) 
0.1004 
(0.0679) 
CAPTOASSETS -0.3722 (0.8138) 
0.1240 
(0.1419) 
0.2421*** 
(0.0628) 
-0.0612 
(0.1159) 
SPREAD_GBYREPO 1.2999
*** 
(0.3182) 
0.7720*** 
(0.0906) 
0.2713*** 
(0.0524) 
0.2152** 
(0.0931) 
grHHI -22.0085 (28.950) 
-2.0717 
(1.5301) 
0.7905 
(2.0504) 
2.7938 
(3.7008) 
grCBDEP -0.1946 (0.2894) 
0.0088 
(0.0369) 
0.0555** 
(0.0228) 
0.0914** 
(0.0425) 
C 7.8616 (6.9069) 
   
SPEED OF ADJ. -0.0943
** 
(0.0422) 
-0.0987*** 
(0.0161) 
-0.4544*** 
(0.0524) 
-0.3370*** 
(0.0665) 
Short-run Dynamics     
ΔMPR 0.0879 (0.0571) 
0.1127*** 
(0.0169) 
0.4338*** 
(0.0481) 
0.3854*** 
(0.0853) 
ΔNPLR 0.0515 (0.0360) 
-0.0183 
(0.0175) 
-0.0060 
(0.0177) 
0.0338 
(0.0241) 
ΔCAPTOASSETS -0.0351 (0.0920) 
0.0122 
(0.0150) 
0.1100*** 
(0.0290) 
-0.0206 
(0.0389) 
ΔSPREAD_GBYREPO 0.1226
*** 
(0.0452) 
0.0762*** 
(0.0127) 
0.1233*** 
(0.0288) 
0.0725** 
(0.0338) 
ΔgrHHI -2.0754 (2.6888) 
-0.2046 
(0.2028) 
0.3592 
(0.9394) 
0.9415 
(1.2413) 
ΔgrCBDEP -0.0184 (0.0226) 
0.0009 
(0.0039) 
0.0252** 
(0.0097) 
0.0308** 
(0.0128) 
C 0.7414 (0.6972) 
-0.0457 
(0.1686) 
-0.1174 
(0.2685) 
0.0916 
(0.4301) 
Trend  0.0009
*** 
(0.0003) 
 0.0033*** 
(0.0010) 
Lag Length Structure 1,0,0,0,1,0,0 1,0,0,0,1,0,0 2,0,0,0,1,0,0 2,1,0,0,0,0,0 
Num. Of obs. 166 166 165 165 
Adj. R-squared 0.9497 0.9972 0.9807 0.9591 
ARDL Bounds Test 2.0710 [2.43 - 3.52] 
12.4831 
[3.077 - 4.284] 
13.858 
[2.627 - 3.864] 
4.8989 
[3.077 - 4.284] 
Covariance Matrix HAC WHITE   
Notes: ***, **, * - shows statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%. The sample covers period from January 2004 to 
November 2017. The lag length structure is chosen according to the Schwarz Criterion (SC) while the maximum lag length is set 
at twelve lags. We include the linear trend into the equation only if it is statistically significant. Terms in parentheses show standard 
errors and values in brackets are critical values for the ARDL Bound test. Term WHITE (HAC) means that we used the White (the 
Newey-West HAC) covariance matrix to deal with an observed heteroscedasticity (autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity) in the 
residuals for the estimated model.  
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Table 2 – Multiple Breakpoint Tests for Baseline Model 
 Consumer Lending Rate 
Mortgage Lending 
Rate 
SME Lending 
Rate 
Corporate Lending 
Rate 
 No. of breaks No. of breaks 
Estimated 
Break 
Dates 
No. of breaks No. of breaks 
Estimated 
Break 
Dates 
1. Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined breaks 
Sequential F-statistic 
determined breaks: 0 2 
2010M09 
2014M02 0 2 
2007M08 
2011M01 
Significant F-statistic 
largest breaks: 0 2 
2010M09 
2014M02 0 2 
2007M08 
2011M01 
UDmax determined 
breaks: 0 1 2007M07 0 1 2011M01 
WDmax determined 
breaks: 0 2 
2010M09 
2014M02 0 1 2011M01 
2. Compare information criteria for 0 to M globally determined breaks 
Schwarz criterion 
selected breaks: 0 0 
 0 1 2011M01 
LWZ criterion 
selected breaks: 0 0 
 0 0  
3. Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially determined breaks 
Sequential F-statistic 
determined breaks: 0 2 
2007M06 
2010M05 0 2 
2009M01 
2011M01 
4. Bai tests of breaks in all recursively determined partitions 
Sequential F-statistic 
determined breaks: 0 2 
2007M06 
2010M05 0 2 
2009M01 
2011M01 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Specification of Structural Dummies 
 dummy_1 dummy_2 
Consumer Loans - - 
Mortgage Loans Value of 0 before 2010M09 and 1 thereafter. 
Value of 0 before 2014M02 
and 1 thereafter. 
SME Loans - - 
Corporate Loans Value of 0 before 2007M08 and 1 thereafter. 
Value of 0 before 2011M01 
and 1 thereafter. 
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Table 4 – Results of the Model with Dummy Variables Based on Bai-Perron Breakpoint Test 
 (5) (6) 
 Mortgage Loans Corporate Loans 
Long-run Cointegration Relationship 
MPR 0.9795
*** 
(0.0929) 
1.1567*** 
(0.1268) 
NPLR -0.0500 (0.1610) 
0.0731** 
(0.0318) 
CAPTOASSETS 0.1498 (0.1089) 
0.0586 
(0.0617) 
SPREAD_GBYREPO 0.6797
*** 
(0.0747) 
0.0882 
(0.0555) 
grHHI -1.7671 (1.0844) 
0.6238 
(1.5525) 
grCBDEP 0.0124 (0.0235) 
0.0318* 
(0.0162) 
DUMMY_1 -0.4494 (0.3188) 
1.0315** 
(0.4985) 
DUMMY_2 -0.3215 (0.1995) 
-0.8012*** 
(0.1463) 
MPR*DUMMY_1 -0.3857 (0.2988) 
-0.2832 
(0.1748) 
MPR*DUMMY_2 -1.3548
*** 
(0.5099) 
0.1693 
(0.1532) 
SPEED OF ADJ. -0.1383
*** 
(0.0195) 
-0.7490*** 
(0.0654) 
Short-run Dynamics   
ΔMPR 0.1354
*** 
(0.0175) 
0.8664*** 
(0.1210) 
ΔNPLR -0.0069 (0.0225) 
0.0548** 
(0.0239) 
ΔCAPTOASSETS 0.0207 (0.0161) 
0.0439 
(0.0460) 
ΔSPREAD_GBYREPO 0.0940
*** 
(0.0131) 
0.0661 
(0.0409) 
ΔgrHHI -0.2443 (0.1916) 
0.4672 
(1.1636) 
ΔgrCBDEP 0.0017 (0.0037) 
0.0238** 
(0.0118) 
ΔDUMMY_1 -0.0621 (0.0462) 
0.7726* 
(0.3918) 
ΔDUMMY_2 -0.0444
* 
(0.0249) 
-0.6001*** 
(0.1227) 
ΔMPR*DUMMY_1 -0.0533 (0.0358) 
-0.2121 
(0.1349) 
ΔMPR*DUMMY_2 -0.1873 (0.1222) 
0.1268 
(0.1165) 
C -0.0644 (0.1658) 
-0.4498 
(0.5544) 
Trend 0.0016
*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0054** 
(0.0025) 
Lag Structure: 1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0 1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 
Num. Of obs. 166 166 
Adj. R-squared 0.9975 0.9647 
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ARDL Bounds Test 11.2147 [2.33 - 3.46] 
13.4994 
[2.33 – 3.46] 
Covariance Matrix WHITE  
Notes: ***, **, * - shows statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%. The sample covers period from January 2004 to 
November 2017. The lag length structure is chosen according to the Schwarz Criterion (SC) while the maximum lag length is set 
at three lags. We include the linear trend into the equation only if it is statistically significant. Terms in parentheses show standard 
errors and values in brackets are critical values for the ARDL Bound test. Term WHITE means that we used the White covariance 
matrix to deal with an observed heteroscedasticity in the model.  
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Table 5 – Results of the Model with Interaction Terms 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Consumer Loans Mortgage Loans SME Loans 
Corporate 
Loans 
Long-run Cointegration Relationship 
MPR 6.0214
* 
(3.0506) 
3.9728*** 
(0.9946) 
0.4183 
(0.4133) 
3.4095*** 
(0.6645) 
NPLR 0.4793
** 
(0.1904) 
-0.1347 
(0.2779) 
-0.0340 
(0.0487) 
0.1606** 
(0.0753) 
CAPTOASSETS 0.4545 (0.4145) 
0.0481 
(0.1861) 
0.2256*** 
(0.0598) 
-0.1841 
(0.1200) 
SPREAD_GBYREPO 1.5342
*** 
(0.2854) 
0.7350*** 
(0.1436) 
0.3032*** 
(0.0666) 
0.0917 
(0.0954) 
grHHI -15.636 (17.017) 
-2.1188 
(1.9382) 
0.5800 
(2.1699) 
2.9652 
(3.9274) 
grCBDEP -0.1075 (0.1698) 
0.0067 
(0.0374) 
0.0581 
(0.0376) 
0.0978** 
(0.0440) 
MPR*NPLR -0.3569 (0.2443) 
-0.1154 
(0.2266) 
  
MPR*CAPTOASSETS -0.2372 (0.4141) 
-0.3233*** 
(0.1158) 
0.0577 
(0.0440) 
-0.2756*** 
(0.0674) 
MPR*SPREAD_GBYREPO  0.0580 (0.0889) 
-0.0231 
(0.0436) 
 
MPR*GRCBDEP   0.0145 (0.0340) 
 
SPEED OF ADJ. -0.1483
*** 
(0.0452) 
-0.0979*** 
(0.0192) 
-0.4049*** 
(0.0529) 
-0.3141*** 
(0.0560) 
Short-run Dynamics 
ΔMPR 0.8928
* 
(0.4763) 
0.3889*** 
(0.0780) 
0.1694 
(0.1764) 
1.0708*** 
(0.2607) 
ΔNPLR 0.0711 (0.0497) 
-0.0132 
(0.0269) 
-0.0137 
(0.0182) 
0.0505** 
(0.0250) 
ΔCAPTOASSETS 0.0674 (0.1143) 
0.0047 
(0.0184) 
0.0914*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.0578 
(0.0378) 
ΔSPREAD_GBYREPO 0.2275
*** 
(0.0546) 
0.0719*** 
(0.0166) 
0.1228*** 
(0.0330) 
0.0288 
(0.0304) 
ΔgrHHI -2.3184 (2.6197) 
-0.2074 
(0.1901) 
0.2349 
(0.9415) 
0.9313 
(1.2304) 
ΔgrCBDEP -0.0159 (0.0220) 
0.0007 
(0.0037) 
0.0235 
(0.0190) 
0.0307** 
(0.0126) 
ΔMPR*NPLR -0.0529 (0.0428) 
-0.0113 
(0.0217) 
  
ΔMPR*CAPTOASSETS -0.0352 (0.0751) 
-0.0317*** 
(0.0099) 
0.0234 
(0.0174) 
-0.0866*** 
(0.0242) 
ΔMPR*SPREAD_GBYREPO  0.0057 (0.0087) 
-0.0094 
(0.0184) 
 
ΔMPR*GRCBDEP   0.0059 (0.0201) 
 
C -0.0269 (0.8438) 
0.1601 
(0.1486) 
-0.0016 
(0.2767) 
0.8854** 
(0.3745) 
Lag Structure 1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0 1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,2,0 2,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0 2,0,0,0,0,0,0,1 
Num. Of obs. 166 165 165 165 
Adj. R-squared 0.9524 0.9976 0.9810 0.9597 
ARDL Bounds Test 2.9222 9.3839 9.0615 5.1358 
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[2.22 - 3.39] [2.14 - 3.3] [2.14 - 3.3] [2.48 - 3.75] 
Covariance Matrix HAC  WHITE  
Notes: ***, **, * - shows statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%. The sample covers period from January 2004 to 
November 2017. The lag length structure is chosen according to the Schwarz Criterion (SC) while the maximum lag length is set 
at three lags. We include the linear trend into the equation only if it is statistically significant. Terms in parentheses show standard 
errors and values in brackets are critical values for the ARDL Bound test. Term WHITE (HAC) means that we used the White (the 
Newey-West HAC) covariance matrix to deal with an observed heteroscedasticity (autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity) in the 
estimated model residuals.  
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Table 6 - Multiple Breakpoint Tests for Model with Interaction Terms 
 Mortgage Lending Rate Corporate Lending Rate 
 No. of breaks No. of breaks Estimated Break Dates 
1. Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks: - 0  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks: - 2 2007M08 2011M01 
UDmax determined breaks: - 2 2007M08 2011M01 
WDmax determined breaks: - 2 2007M08 2011M01 
2. Compare information criteria for 0 to M globally determined breaks 
Schwarz criterion selected breaks: - 2 2007M08 2011M01 
LWZ criterion selected breaks: - 0  
3. Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially determined breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks: 0 0  
4. Bai tests of breaks in all recursively determined partitions 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks: 0 0  
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Table 7 – Results of the Model with an Interaction term and Dummy Variables 
 (11) 
 Corporate Loans 
Long-run Cointegration Relationship 
MPR 1.8278
*** 
(0.5341) 
NPLR 0.1101
** 
(0.0432) 
CAPTOASSETS -0.0668 (0.0664) 
SPREAD_GBYREPO 0.0179 (0.0537) 
grHHI 0.7113 (2.1485) 
grCBDEP 0.0504
** 
(0.0233) 
MPR*CAPTOASSETS -0.1187
** 
(0.0567) 
DUMMY_1 0.5363
*** 
(0.1096) 
DUMMY_2 -0.5710
*** 
(0.1148) 
SPEED OF ADJ. -0.5449
*** 
(0.0751) 
Short-run Dynamics 
MPR 0.9960
*** 
(0.2854 
NPLR 0.0600
** 
(0.0241) 
CAPTOASSETS -0.0364 (0.0360) 
SPREAD_GBYREPO 0.0098 (0.0293) 
grHHI 0.3876 (1.1670) 
grCBDEP 0.0274
** 
(0.0119) 
MPR*CAPTOASSETS -0.0163 (0.0309) 
DUMMY_1 0.2923
*** 
(0.0795) 
DUMMY_2 -0.3111
*** 
(0.0724) 
C 1.0555 (0.6317) 
Lag Structure 2,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0 
Num. Of obs. 165 
Adj. R-squared 0.9643 
ARDL Bounds Test 6.2915 [2.14 - 3.3] 
Notes: ***, **, * - shows statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%. The sample covers period from January 2004 to 
November 2017. The lag length structure is chosen according to the Schwarz Criterion (SC) while the maximum lag length is set 
at three lags. We include the linear trend into the equation only if it is statistically significant. Terms in parentheses show standard 
errors and values in brackets are critical values for the ARDL Bound test.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 - Data series and their sources 
 Variable Data source 
Dependent Variables 
Consumer lending rate LRCONS CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Mortgage lending rate LRMORT CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Small corporate loans lending rate LRSME CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Large corporate loans lending rate LRCORP CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Explanatory Variables 
2-week Repurchase rate MPR CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Non-performing loans ratio for consumer loans NPLRCONS CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Non-performing loans ratio for mortgages NPLRMORT CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Non-performing loans ratio for non-financial 
corporations NPLRCORP CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Ratio of banks capital to total banks assets CAPTOASSETS CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Spread between government bond yield and repo rate SPREAD_GBYREPO CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index HHI CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
CNB’s deposits in foreign banks CBDEP CNB - ARAD DATABASE 
Dummy Variables 
Dummy based on Bai and Perron multiple break test DUMMY_1 Constructed by the Authors 
Dummy based on Bai and Perron multiple break test DUMMY_2 Constructed by the Authors 
 
 
Table A2 - Summary statistics of used variables 
Variable Observations Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
LRCONS 167 13.170 13.7 15.23 8.73 1.503 
LRMORT 167 4.087 4.41 5.6 2.13 1.108 
LRSME 167 3.861 3.9 5.91 2.25 1.018 
LRCORP 167 2.828 2.77 5.11 1.35 0.932 
MPR 167 1.198 0.75 3.75 0.05 1.153 
NPLRCONS 167 9.744 9.21 12.52 6.04 2.056 
NPLRMORT 167 2.424 2.23 3.48 1.52 0.724 
NPLRNFC 167 6.197 6.24 9.66 2.91 1.724 
CAPTOASSETS 167 10.561 10.63 11.996 8.874 0.837 
SPRD_GBYREPO 167 1.809 1.71 3.95 0.2 0.962 
HHI 167 1084 1080 1166 986 47.86 
CBDEP 167 3336 484 43687 25.24 7360.81 
Source: CNB’s ARAD database (2017) 
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Table A3 - Cross correlation between variables 
Correlation 
in First Diff. MPR 
NPLR 
CONS 
NPLR 
MORT 
NPLR 
NFC 
CAPTO 
ASSETS 
SPREAD 
GBYREPO HHI 
CB 
DEP 
LRCONS  0.015 0.085 0.190 0.111 -0.026 -0.162 -0.092 -0.063 
LRMORT  0.269 -0.022 -0.033 0.107 0.030 -0.088 -0.001 -0.4E-04 
LRSME  0.276 -0.227 -0.183 -0.083 0.172 0.118 -0.085 0.111 
LRCORP  0.361 -0.023 -0.148 -0.059 0.019 -0.093 -0.037 -0.024 
MPR  1 -0.119 -0.295 -0.195 0.024 -0.357 -0.115 0.048 
NPLRCONS   1 0.433 0.166 0.068 -0.052 0.057 -0.271 
NPLRMORT    1 0.377 0.066 0.027 -0.009 -0.064 
NPLRNFC     1 0.320 0.011 -0.079 0.045 
CAPTOASSETS      1 -0.109 0.030 0.010 
SPRD_GBYREPO       1 -0.001 -0.037 
HHI        1 -0.079 
CBDEP         1 
Source: CNB’s ARAD database (2017) 
 
 
Table A4 - Stationarity tests 
Null Hypothesis: TIME SERIE has a unit root  TIME SERIE is stationary 
 Level  First Difference  Level  First Difference 
 ADF test stat. PP test stat.  ADF test stat. PP test stat.  KPSS test stat.  KPSS test stat. 
LRCONS -1.007 -1.100  -12.98*** -12.99***   0.209   0.213 
LRMORT -2.172** -2.033**  -8.209*** -8.422***   0.299***   0.125* 
LRSME -2.352 -2.936  -16.80*** -16.82***   0.224***   0.248 
LRCORP -2.104 -2.332  -15.84*** -15.86***   0.226***   0.152 
MPR -2.925 -1.175  -3.443*** -8.476***   0.144*   0.110 
NPLRCONS -0.302 -0.310  -11.81*** -11.91***   0.177**   0.320 
NPLRMORT -0.278  0.037  -2.982*** -7.385***   0.205**   0.278*** 
NPLRNFC -2.957** -2.231  -4.088*** -9.402***   0.173**   0.282 
CAPTOASSETS  0.110  0.234  -13.01*** -13.41***   0.211**   0.170 
SPREAD_GBYREPO -1.184 -1.283  -8.741*** -8.575***   0.237***   0.112 
HHI -1.939 -1.963  -12.96*** -12.94***   0.140*   0.067 
CBDEP  2.447 -0.034  -10.81*** -14.15***   0.297***   0.468** 
Notes: ***, **, * - shows statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
Source: CNB’s ARAD database (2017) 
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Table A5 – Unit root test with a structural break 
 
Level  First Difference  
ADF test 
statistic 
Break 
Date: 
Zivot-Andrews 
test statistic 
Break 
Date: 
 ADF test 
statistic 
Break 
Date: 
LRCONS -2.93 2014M12 -3.37 2014M12  -14.69*** 2005M06 
LRMORT -1.97 2010M03 -4.62* 2007M06  -8.73*** 2009M12 
LRSME -2.91 2008M11 -3.68 2007M05  -17.92*** 2008M08 
LRCORP -3.02 2010M11 -3.37 2006M08  -17.25*** 2009M01 
MPR -4.80** 2008M10 -4.35 2008M11  -4.48** 2008M11 
NPLRCONS -2.98 2009M06 -3.23 2010M01  -13.69*** 2010M09 
NPLRMORT -2.76 2008M12 -3.51 2009M03  -3.94 2013M03 
NPLRNFC -3.65 2007M04 -4.92* 2009M01  -4.51** 2007M11 
CAPTOASSETS -3.71 2009M05 -3.32 2009M07  -13.75*** 2015M12 
SPREAD_GBYREPO -2.56 2014M01 -5.53*** 2008M11  -9.68*** 2009M02 
HHI -3.29 2014M09 -3.74*** 2011M01  -15.34*** 2007M11 
CBDEP -0.86 2005M03 1.53** 2015M11  -21.76*** 2005M03 
Notes: ***, **, * - shows statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
Source: CNB’s ARAD database (2017) 
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Figure A1 - Rolling Coefficient of the Spread between GBY and the Repo Rate (Baseline Model) 
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Notes: Rolling regression with fixed window (window size: 75, step size: 1, number of subsamples: 92). Horizontal lines represent 
confidence intervals of two, three and six standard deviations.  
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Figure A2 - CUSUM for Best Fit Models 
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Figure A3 - CUSUM of Squares for Best Fit Models 
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